The Syria Question

I wanted to take a break from my planned post for today to speak for a moment about the looming expansion of the conflict in Syria. There’s always a conflict waiting to erupt somewhere around the world. The world is a complicated place and we don’t really get along so well. The justifications are diverse, but if one of your loved ones dies those words amount to a hill of beans. Now, we have the matter of Syria.

I have loved military aircraft for a long time. I spent my childhood reading all about every air force plane I could. The F-117A, C-17, F-15, F-22… I love almost everything bout air power. It’s difficult to explain that there is a difference between liking military aircraft and disliking war. I don’t like war. There is no doubt that there are times that military force is necessary and justified, but I sincerely believe that war is more often than not the result of one or both sides refusing to deal in reality and in good faith towards the avoidance of conflict.

My theory of military force is as a deterrent. The reason I think the F-22 program was a good idea, despite the increased use of drones, is because when it comes to combat, air superiority is still important, and having a well-equipped, well-trained air fleet will win out over small remote controlled planes. Military force should exist as a deterrent against those who would seek to exert overbearing force to achieve whatever ends they’re seeking. And yes, there are times when that military might must be flexed, if for nothing more than to prove that it is there. However, military force used too readily, too capriciously, ceases to be a “deterrent” and becomes more akin to a “threat”.  What is the difference? A deterrent says, “I will protect myself if need be” while a threat says, “I might attack you for whatever reason”. Through US history we have swung between the extremes of these stances; we’ve stifled military force to the point of our word being questioned, and we’ve carelessly brandished force with disregard for the consequences.

A lot of this is easier reflected on in hindsight than it probably was at the time it went on. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor at the outset of WWII we may have felt fully justified in an isolationist stance and a policy of minimalist military under the theory that by way of that small military footprint. It is in hindsight that we can see that by having too small a military we perhaps presented ourselves as being incapable of defending ourselves and emboldening those who might want to try attacking us. Had we been stronger militarily we may have been able to avoid Pearl Harbor, and could have managed a more expedient end to the war by dissuading the growth of the Axis powers.

We justified our stances in Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, and Vietnam during the Cold War, engaging in an arms race and proxy wars with Russia in an attempt to show we were militarily stout and could repel any threat. It is in hindsight that we now see that what we ended up doing was expending a lot of money, resources, and lives, for indefinite gains. Afghanistan became a haven for terrorists who’ve now had us locked in perpetual conflict with them for more than a decade, Iraq was ruled by a despot and we ended up fighting two wars there, Korea was split in half, one of those halves now one of the world’s most notorious actors, and in some respects Vietnam is still trying to recover from the war we had there; not to mention all the lives we’ve lost in all of these conflicts.

Our future is informed by our past. That doesn’t mean what a lot of people seem to think it means. Often people tend to think that you simply take the most close semblance to the present situation in history, overlay the two, and take the action either identical or opposite to the one taken in the historic example. Things don’t work so simply. Times change, and situations change with them. Circumstances can be similar, but associated factors can have profound impacts outcomes. Different actors on the stage or behind the scenes, different global circumstances, the very fact that this is a different time and that there is a history from which to be informed, can all have unpredictable impacts on what outcomes will look like.

And that is the crux of the difficulty in the use of military force in any context at any time. It is a tool. It is not a panacea. You don’t fight the flu by going for chemotherapy, and you don’t beat cancer by taking a few Tylenol. There are prescriptions applicable to different symptoms and illnesses. There are those who look to military force as the answer to everything, as though there is no issue that cannot be remedied with enough bullets, bombs, and missiles. Then there are those who think that there is no time ever when military force is justified; that diplomatic efforts can tame even the worst of the world’s bad actors when they start acting out.

Syria is a complicated problem. The events that have been going on there for over a year and a half are tragic. It is painful to even imagine what it must be like to live in a country that is tearing itself apart. The idea that those people must now contend with the threat of the government and military might start unabashedly using chemical weapons to quash opposition is beyond comprehension, to the point you have to wonder how anyone in that country can even get to sleep at night for worry.

What is the international community’s duty in all of this? I do believe there are separate considerations. In the broader civil war the most the international community should do is express a preference of outcomes; choose a side. Do the rebels, the would-be revolutionaries, have a just cause that should be supported, or is the regime right in trying to protect its existence? Each nation can make their estimation of that. But no nations should involve itself on either side. No arming the rebels, not arming the Syrian government; as unfeasible as it may seem, I would have preferred that as an ideal response there was essentially a cessation of activity involving Syria until the point that the conflict ends. Then from there I would look to a reevaluation of relationships. If the nation has a track record of not adhering to a set of principles commensurate with a nation’s own, there is no reason that much business should have been undertaken with them in the first place. You are tangentially supporting their activities if you do so. Their actions in the conflict, your view of their stance, should inform the future of your involvement with them. If they are a bad actor and have continued to demonstrate themselves as such, then they should be isolated.

However, when it comes to the use of certain weapons, there should be swift, decisive, repercussions for their use. Chemical, biological, nuclear weapons have been developed by many nations in the past. That was a grievous error. It was a shortsighted solution to a question of how to end war quickly. Chemical weapons in particular were developed with the idea that simply seeing their effects would terrify the enemy into submission. As an international community we determined that chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons should not be used and should not be proliferated. It is the reason why the suggestion of Saddam Hussein stockpiling chemical weapons, despite lack of real proof of the same, was so compelling to some that war was deemed justified with Iraq a decade ago.

Sound, solid evidence is the first lesson that we are informed of from history. But there is at least one other; you break it, you own it. Much of the rhetoric out of the White House has been specifically directed towards specifying that action, in whatever form that ultimately takes, would be precisely targeted at punishing the use of chemical weapons. While that may be a conceivable outcome in some regards, the reality is that by intervening in any way in what is an ongoing conflict we will in turn take ownership of the consequences. Toppling regime may not be the express goal, but any action we take will have some measure of a destabilizing effect, and will thereby be placing a heavy thumb on the scales towards a given outcome. We cannot simply toss our weight around, effect regime change, and then leave the country to struggle along after we’ve blown it apart. It is the reason that despite disapproving of our getting involved in Iraq, I felt we burdened ourselves with the responsibility of doing what we could to help them back on their feet.

Nevertheless, if we do feel that three were chemical weapons used in Syria, we have the responsibility to enforce the international resolve that such weapons are not to be used anywhere at any time for any reason. We risk the emboldening of other bad actors, other governments and militaries, to develop and use these weapons as soon as they think they’re being backed into a corner.

There is a strong case not to get involved with Syria. There is a strong case to get involved with Syria. Is there a clean answer? By now that should be an obvious “no”. It is a terrible, messy, situation. I fear the precedent that would be set should noting be done. What would inaction say about our holding the use of such weapons in such low esteem?

We NEED to wait for the proper evidence, not just the US intelligence agency, but the UN as well. We NEED to gather as many allies as we can and lay out a concise, comprehensive goal. We NEED to be patient enough to wait for these things, but bold enough to act at the appropriate point. I hope that when the time comes we don’t hamstring ourselves purely out of fear of the shadow of our past. We can learn from our mistakes in the past, but that doesn’t mean simply climbing in a shell, burying our heads in the sand, and ignoring the world around us when terrible things happen. This is a case for action. I hope we have the wherewithal to respond appropriately.